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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

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DATE	June 2, 1985	11:30 A.M.	CITY	Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT	The Walker Case			

LESLEY STAHL: According to the FBI, there are more Americans charged with espionage today than ever before in American history.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR WEINBERGER: The Walker case represents, I think it's fair to say, a serious loss, and it'd gone on a very long time.

STAHL: The most recent case, John Walker, his son Michael, and his brother Arthur, all Navy men. John Walker and his son have been indicted on six counts of spying for the Soviet Union.

Navy sources fear the documents passed from the U.S.S. Nimitz by son Michael, among other papers, have taught the Soviets how the U.S. tracks their submarines. FBI officials acknowledge they had no clue about the alleged spy ring till they were tipped off six months ago by John Walker's ex-wife and one of his three daughters.

How widespread is the Soviet spy network in the United States? We'll ask the head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, Steve Trott. And we'll hear from Michael Walker's lawyer, Charles Bernstein.

It's being said that ninety percent of the Soviet diplomats in the U.S. spend time trying to recruit spies. Is the government doing all it can to stop them? We'll ask former Deputy Director of the CIA Bobby Inman and Senator Patrick Leahy of the Select Committee on Intelligence. And a Soviet bloc defector, Stanislav Ruraj, a former Polish diplomat in Washington, will tell us how the Soviets go about recruiting

average Americans to their cause.

Spying in America, an issue facing the nation.

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STAHL: The Justice Department has been hinting that there may soon be more arrests in the Walker case. We spoke with Stephen Trott, head of the Department's Criminal Division, and asked him if the case is bigger than reported.

STEPHEN TROTT: This case has been under intensive investigation by the FBI for six months. And what I can tell you is it is not out of the question that more arrests will be made. The FBI is very thorough on these and they will make sure that every possible lead and implication will be run down.

STAHL: When can we expect more arrests?

TROTT: Well, that I can't tell you.

STAHL: Monday?

TROTT: I can't give you a date.

STAHL: Okay.

Perhaps you can talk, then, about a report that the Navy is trying to gain control of this case. They apparently have some concern that if the Justice Department tries it, then perhaps some of the naval operations will be compromised in the trial as evidence comes out. Is the Navy trying to gain control of this case?

TROTT: No. And it's never been a question of control. We've worked very closely from the Navy -- with the Navy from the beginning on this case to make sure that all of our options are explored before we make decisions. As you know, we have the military courts available, as well as regular federal court. And the decision has been made at this point to pursue these cases in federal court. We believe we can do that without compromising any of the secrets that are involved in this case.

STAHL: So it's not true, then, that the Navy plans to recall the two brothers, John and Arthur Walker, back into the service so that they can be tried in a military court. You're saying that's not going to happen.

TROTT: Well, all I can tell you at this point is that the case is going to be tried in federal court, not in military court.

STAHL: Okay.

Let's talk about the FBI, then. Isn't it true that the FBI wouldn't have known a thing about this case if Mr. Walker's ex-wife hadn't come in and tipped the Bureau off?

TROTT: Well, this case did start with that type of a tip. The FBI did its usual very good job once it got the information some months ago in putting these cases together.

STAHL: Well, let's talk, then, about how the FBI can spot someone when there isn't a tip. Is it impossible?

TROTT: No, it's not impossible. And as a matter of fact, many cases are made by the good FBI surveillance that does exist.

STAHL: But why didn't they get this case? It's gone on for 18 years.

TROTT: Well, I'm not really sure. I can tell you that some of the failures of our government of this country to find out when this kind of stuff is going on is nothing more than a byproduct of the liberty that we enjoy in this country. This is not a police state. The presumption is that people are innocent, and we don't surveil every citizen in this country all the time for everything.

One of the byproducts of that, one of the prices that you pay is occasionally you're going to get a seam in that type of liberty and somebody, for money or for other reasons, will take advantage of it and become a spy.

STAHL: It seems -- am I wrong? It seems that more people are becoming spies. When I was young Americans didn't spy against their country. Why are we hearing about more? Is it that there are more, or that you're catching more?

TROTT: Well, between 1966 and 1975 we had no federal prosecutions for espionage. Why, I really can't tell you. But between 1975 and now we've had 37 prosecutions, 27 of which have involved the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc countries. As I said, last year was our most productive year in terms of catching espionage activities.

I believe, and the people with whom I've consulted believe, that there both is more espionage going on now, number one; and number two, we've gotten a lot better in detecting it.

STAHL: Why is there more now? And who are these people who are selling out their country?

TROTT: A profile of an individual is fairly hard to describe. There's a certain amount of amorality involved in it, and usually you do find some variety of financial involvement. It's a way to make money.

STAHL: You know, there's sort of an assumption by, I think, some conservatives in the country that these spies, people are left-wingers who sort of grew up in the Vietnam era and sold out their country because they're not patriotic. But what we seem to be finding are more traditional middle-class Americans who work for the military, or work for the FBI.

Do you see something unusual in the fact that so many people come out of the government itself?

TROTT: No. I think it really -- they, in a sense, defy the type of precise characterization that we always tend to look for in these cases. And I think if you start saying, "Well, this type of person is a spy, and that type of person is not," you're making a massive mistake, in terms of investigating these cases.

Unfortunately, spies come in all different sizes, shapes, colors, backgrounds, philosophies. And anybody who has access to this type of information, who has some sort of a strange personal situation going on or a shaky financial situation going on is liable to be this type of person.

STAHL: Well, if we know, as we're told, that 90 percent of the Soviet diplomats in the United States are here basically to recruit spies, why isn't there more, or is there, a lot of attention, eavesdropping, whatever, on them?

TROTT: There is attention paid to these people. And that, as a matter of fact, explains some of the cases that have been made in recent years. The FBI has spotted this going on and picked it up before it happened.

STAHL: Well, let me ask you on that front, then, why the Soviet diplomat who was apparently Mr. Walker's contact was allowed to leave the United States. Was there a deal with the Soviet Union?

TROTT: Oh, absolutely not. But beyond that, it's not appropriate for me to comment on those kinds of interior matters inside a case that's not yet gone to trial.

STAHL: But you are denying that there was a deal with the Soviet Union to let him slip out of the country.

TROTT: There was absolutely no deal with the Soviet Union.

STAHL: Tell me about plea-bargaining. I understand that one of the concerns the Navy has is that you might let the Walkers plea-bargain so that you could catch some bigger fish. How much plea-bargaining do you do in these kinds of cases? And might you plea-bargain in this case?

TROTT: None. And we won't, in the sense that I think you're using that term. Will we allow these people to get off light in order to get information from them? The answer is no.

STAHL: Will you allow them to get off lighter than they otherwise would?

TROTT: No. And I think all you have to do is look at some of the sentences that have come down recently in these kinds of cases and you'll see, as I said, in the Cavanaugh case a life sentence, in the Harper case a life sentence. We regard these cases as extraordinarily serious, and we intend to pursue them to the full limit of the law.

STAHL: But we hear that there are many more spies that are caught and not prosecuted in the country, many. That would seem that some immunity is given in return for information. Is this not true?

TROTT: There are a number of ranges of activity that are available to us, meaning the Federal Government, when somebody is caught in this type of a situation. And it is clear that sometimes the choice is made to turn that person around against the person who is paying him in the first place. The old double agent game. And on occasion it makes more sense in the long-range national security interest of the country to do something like that than prosecute.

That's why I say whenever we get one of these cases we explore every option to make sure that the outcome essentially is in the best overall interest of the United States.

STAHL: Stephen Trott of the Justice Department.

The court appointed attorney Charles Bernstein of Baltimore to represent the 22-year-old son, Michael Walker. We spoke with Bernstein briefly yesterday.

CHARLES BERNSTEIN: He's specifically charged in five of the six counts, and the counts involve various allegations of attempted delivery or unlawfully obtaining national defense information. And if you will forgive me for being a lawyer and saying so, this is of course a charge. It merely is a means of bringing the lawsuit and tells everyone what it is the government has to prove in this case to make its case.

STAHL: Now, you are going into court on Tuesday, and you will be offering your plea.

BERNSTEIN: Yes.

STAHL: How will Michael Walker plead on Tuesday?

BERNSTEIN: He will plead not guilty to all counts.

STAHL: He'll plead not guilty to spying for the Soviet Union.

BERNSTEIN: The charge is not specifically spying. But as to all counts in the indictment, the plea will be not guilty.

STAHL: But let me ask you something. As we've been told by the indictment and by the other papers that have been filed in the case, 15 pounds of documents were found near his bunk, and there were these incriminating letters. Isn't it going to be awfully hard to plead not guilty?

BERNSTEIN: Well, what you're asking me to do is comment on the evidence. And various legal rules and ethical considerations prevent me from doing that at this time. But we will plead not guilty on Tuesday.

STAHL: And I assume by what you say you feel the government is going to have a difficult time proving the charges.

BERNSTEIN: I didn't say that. I hope they will have a difficult time. It will be my job to try and give them a difficult job. Whether they will or they're not -- or won't, we'll find out in court.

STAHL: Can you tell us something about your client's state of mind at this point?

BERNSTEIN: To the extent that I'm allowed to comment on these things, his state of mind is consistent with what you would expect with a young man, a newlywed facing these very serious charges.

STAHL: Is he depressed?

BERNSTEIN: I don't know if I'd say depressed. He's concerned, as he should be.

STAHL: Attorney Charles Bernstein.

We'll be back with a look at how Soviets recruit spies.

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STAHL: With us now from Austin, Texas, the former number two man at the CIA, Admiral Bobby Inman. From Los Angeles, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont. And here in Washington, former Polish diplomat Jiswav (?) Ruraj.

Senator Leahy, let me ask you a question first. We are beginning to get the impression that the major concern may not be that the Soviets have learned very important secrets from the United States, but really that the Navy has been embarrassed because they let this spy situation go on for 18 years.

As you sit on the Intelligence Committee, which do you think is the major concern here?

SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY: Well, I think that the Navy has a lot of reason to be embarrassed, but I would hope that that wouldn't be the driving factor here.

As a former prosecutor, I'd like to see them just get on with the prosecution. Let the FBI, let the Justice Department prosecute. They're well set up to do that. What the Navy ought to do is go back and find out what it was that allowed this to go on for so many years.

And the reason I say that is that this is one case. But if anybody thinks that this is the only case of espionage that's sitting out there, they make a terrible, terrible mistake. The Soviets have close to a thousand agents in this country actively trying to put together cases of this nature. The Walker case is only one of them. There are others out there. And I would think, instead of everybody trying to figure out who gets credit or who gets blame -- and I'm not prepared to levy either -- but instead of doing that, they ought to go out and find the rest of these cases, because they're there, it's damaging this country, and we are in a very, very serious problem.

STAHL: How serious do you hear the information that the Soviets got out of these -- out of the Walkers has been?

SENATOR LEAHY: Well, just based on what has been in the public press, it has to appear to be very, very serious; in fact, one of the more serious breaches of our security.

But the thing that we somehow seem to ignore in this country is that these same kind of attempts are going on all the time. We want to have arms control, and that's proper, of course. We want to have detente with the Soviet Union. That is also proper. But somehow we lose sight of the fact that the Soviets have for generations worked very hard at this espionage game. They are seeking to penetrate everything from our defense industry to our people to the military. And we are just not

prepared to cope with it. We are not doing an adequate job.

STAHL: Let's turn to Admiral Inman and ask him, why now? We did not have spies in this country, as Stephen Trott said, up through 1975. Why now?

ADMIRAL BOBBY INMAN: Well, first, I think we did have them in those years in between. We were not successful in catching them.

But as you look back at the change in the nature of spying, most of the cases in the '30s and the '40s, those who spied for foreign powers did it for ideological reasons. I don't know of a single case in the last 15 years where ideology had any role at all. People are selling secrets for cash.

And unfortunately, in the early '70s we began opening up this country for -- for good bipartisan reasons: improving trade, trying to improve foreign relations. But in that process, we more than doubled the number of prospective case officers to recruit spies from hostile foreign countries.

In that same time frame, unfortunately, we also drew down the manpower in the FBI, in the military services in the counterintelligence area.

I was told several years ago by an old FBI hand that the desire in the early days was to have four FBI agents for every prospective foreign case officer. By the end of the '70s we had two prospective case officers for every single FBI agent on the counterintelligence field.

STAHL: Well, let's turn to Ambassador Ruraj, who was a Polish diplomat here in Washington and who has defected.

We understand now that there are a thousand, at least, Soviet intelligence agents in this country. Who do they pick out to recruit and how do they go about it?

AMBASSADOR RURARJ: Well, there are different methods. First of all, a case officer coming to this country may sometimes know in advance on who he could be closing on. Or sometimes it is left to his discretion, that he himself would be looking for the prospective, let's say, agent. And it is, of course, up to him to pick up such a person and to close on him. Rather on him, not on her, because this is mainly the male business, unfortunately.

STAHL: How do they go about the recruiting?

AMBASSADOR RURARJ: Well, the recruiting could be a

long, long process. As Admiral Inman says -- I think he's right -- that sometimes it could be just a one-shot business. You are quite simply buying something. Many people are coming, unfortunately, to the Soviet or to other missions with certain materials to sell. And you are buying.

Of course it's much better to have a more permanent contact with such a person because such a person would be disciplined, could be blackmailed and so on. And later, even, if such a person would be not willing to sell something, it could be exposed, so that such a person would be doing anything.

But unfortunately, this is -- well, the Soviet system is very rigid. But when it comes to spying, it's extremely flexible. Extremely.

STAHL: Is 90 percent -- when we say 90 percent of the Soviets in this country are out here recruiting and doing intelligence work, is that an exaggeration, or is that the right number?

AMBASSADOR RURARJ: Well, when I was on foreign assignment, I hardly knew anybody who was not an intelligence or counterintelligence officer. I mean when it comes to Soviet bloc countries.

STAHL: Well, let me turn to Senator Leahy.

If this is true, why don't we expel more of these Russian diplomats in this country?

SENATOR LEAHY: Well, I think that we're going to have to have parity. Senator Cohen and I have an amendment, the Leahy-Cohen Amendment, which would do a great deal of that. It would at least limit the Soviets to the same number of people with diplomatic immunity in the United States as we have in the Soviet Union. That at least seems a step forward. Because I see no reason at all why we should allow them to have these large number of people, and yet they limit the number of people we have in their country. We seem to bend over backward to do their job for them. And I don't know if it's naivete on the part of the United States or what, but I don't think that we should be helping them the way we are. And obviously, they've been very successful with that help.

STAHL: Admiral Inman, what about security measures in this country? You know, Christopher Boyce, who was the subject of that novel The Falcon and the Snowman, he testified recently that when he worked for a defense contractor, someone who was wearing an identification badge with a monkey's picture on it gained access to this security area.

I mean do we have to do something within our country, too?

ADMIRAL INMAN: The level of professionalism in the security services is not what it ought to be, and it's deteriorated over the last 15-20 years. We've replaced Marine guards with contract hire, but we don't pay a salary that offers the prospect of getting people who already have a substantial level of professionalism. So you've got to work at it a long time.

And frankly, we also tend to allocate the existing talent we have against the problem that's got the greatest current headline. I'm told that there are three times as many naval investigative service agents out looking for waste, fraud and abuse, the \$600 ashtray cases, as there are looking for counterintelligence cases.

STAHL: And you think this problem is so widespread --is that what you're suggesting? -- that we have to reverse our priorities here?

ADMIRAL INMAN: I think we really have to relook our priorities.

You're never going to be able to surveil the 4.3 million Americans with security clearances. So you begin with absolutely blanketing every legal -- that is, accredited -- prospective case officer in this country.

STAHL: Okay. If we start doing that, Senator Leahy, don't we begin to erode the very freedom that we are trying to protect when we are in this cold war with the Soviets?

SENATOR LEAHY: No. We can do this totally consistent with an open society. We'll still have all the exchanges, cultural, educational, trade, everything else, with the Soviet Union, as we need in the area of detente.

STAHL: But aren't you talking of surveilling Americans or...

SENATOR LEAHY: No. What we do is, first, be careful where we give the security clearances. We have four million people in this country with security clearances. That's crazy. We have far too many people with access to secrets. If we even went back right today and said, "Okay. Let's just do a recheck on those people with security clearances. We won't give any more. We'll just check those who have it," it would take ten years to do it all.

People apply for security clearances. Ninety-nine

percent of them get it. I can't believe that that's showing enough care.

I think what we have to do is take a very serious, hard-nosed look at it, realize that the Soviets are going to exploit every advantage that they can. And we give them advantages. We give them advantages in where we allow them to put their embassies. We give them advantages in not using secure telephone lines. And we give them advantages in just letting too many people have access to secrets in this country.

STAHL: Okay. Let's turn to Ambassador Ruraj and ask him about the Walker case again.

How important, as you read this case, how important do you think the Walkers were to the Soviets? Were they a major spy network?

AMBASSADOR RURARJ: Oh, definitely yes. The very fact that they could place their agent in such a sensitive area like a nuclear submarine, or his son in a nuclear aircraft carrier, must be extremely gratifying to the Soviets, that they can place their agents in such sensitive areas. It doesn't matter what kind of information they were getting from them. The very fact that he is there is something which is extremely important.

STAHL: Let me ask all of you what you think this is saying to the Soviet Union about the state of morality in the United States?

Bobby Inman.

ADMIRAL INMAN: Lesley, it's one of my great worries. I think where we really start is not with surveillance of Americans, it's trying to raise the sense of all of us about ethics. These are people selling secrets for cash. And it must give the Soviets a very cynical view of this society, that they're able to find so many people who are willing to sell them the country's secrets for cash.

STAHL: Senator Leahy?

SENATOR LEAHY: Lesley, I can't understand how anybody could either betray their family or betray their country. And as an American, as a Senator, I'm greatly saddened by it. I think it's a blot of shame on this country.

STAHL: And in this Walker case, John Walker did both, didn't he?

SENATOR LEAHY: He did both.

STAHL: Because he brought his son into this, and his son now faces a life sentence.

SENATOR LEAHY: He did both. And I just have to hope that this is not at all typical of the people that we have in our government. I hope it's not.

STAHL: Thank you very much, Senator.

I'm sorry, Mr. Inman, we've run out of time.

I want to thank you all for being with us.

We will be back with a cartoon.

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STAHL: Finally, Jeff McNelly of the Chicago Tribune eavesdrops on a conversation aboard the aircraft carrier Nimitz: "Our security problem is worse than we thought. There goes that new Soviet carrier."